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 1 
RECKONING CONTRACT DAMAGES: VALUATION OF 
THE CONTRACT AS AN ASSET 
Victor P. Goldberg 
When a contract is breached the law typically provides some version of the 
aphorism that the non-breaching party should be made whole. The UCC provides that 
“[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the 
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed.”1 The English version, going back to Robinson v Harman (1848),2 is “that 
where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can 
do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had 
been performed”. Similarly, under Article 74 of the CISG “damages are based on the 
principle that damages should provide the injured party with the benefit of the bargain, 
including expectation and reliance damages.”3 International arbitrations often cite the so-
called Chorzow Factory rule: “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”4 However, application of 
the aphorism has proven more problematic. In this paper I propose a general principle 
that should guide application—the contract is an asset and the problem is one of valuation 
of that asset at the time of the breach.
5
 This provides, I argue, a framework that will help 
clear up some conceptual problems in damage assessment. In particular, it will integrate 
three concepts—cover, lost profits, and mitigation—under the asset valuation umbrella. 
 
Consider three patterns in which a contract might be breached. In the first, the 
breach occurs at the time of performance. That is the simplest case. The second is an 
anticipatory repudiation in which the breach occurs before the time for performance, and 
the litigation takes place after the date of performance. Finally, the third involves a 
breach of a long-term contract, the performance of which was to continue past the date 
the litigation would be resolved. At what point should damages be reckoned? I will argue 
that at the moment of breach or repudiation, the damages would be the change in the 
value of the contract (the asset). That implies that when assessing damages, to the extent 
possible, post-breach facts should be ignored.  
 
Let us begin with the simple case. Suppose that Sam Smith agrees to sell 1,000 
shares of Widgetco stock to Betsy Brown for delivery on June 1 at $10 per share. On 
June 1 the market price is $16 and Smith reneges. The case is decided on December 1, 
(hypothetical courts can work very fast) at which time the price has fallen to $9. Brown 
sues for $6,000, the contract-market differential at the date of breach. Smith counters, 
                                                 
1
 Section 1-106. 
2
 1 Exch 850. 
3
 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Measuring Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 737, 742 (1989).  
4
 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) (Judgment No. 13, 
Merits). 
5
 I am not concerned in this paper with the treatment of consequential damages; on that subject, see 
Goldberg, Rethinking Contract Law and Contract Design, ch. 8-10 (2015). (hereafter Rethinking) 
 2 
claiming that he had done Brown a favor and that there should be no damages; the $6,000 
would be a windfall for Brown. Alternatively, suppose that on December 1 the price had 
risen to $25 per share. Brown would now claim that her damage should be measured by 
the price differential on December 1, and therefore she should receive $15,000. Smith 
would argue that damages should be measured by the differential at the date of breach, 
June 1. At the time the claim is being litigated it clearly would matter whether we chose 
the date of breach or the date of litigation as the appropriate date for assessing damages. 
But at the time the parties entered into the contract, would it matter?  
 
Subject to a caveat to be developed below, the answer is “No.” The forward price 
at the time of the breach (or repudiation) should be the expected value at the time of the 
litigation. That is, when entering into the contract, given the choice of remedy between 
the forward price at the time of breach and the actual price at the time of litigation, parties 
should be indifferent. Whether we invoke rational expectations, efficient markets, or 
arbitrage, the conclusion is robust. The caveat has to do with the time value of money. If 
legal prejudgment interest rates were to differ from the market rate, the equality would no 
longer hold.
6
 In this paper I am going to assume that issues concerning the time value of 
money can be adequately dealt with; but this can be an especially serious problem when 
dealing with cases in which the litigation goes on for many years.
7
 So, conceptually we 
should be indifferent between a rule that says always use the breach date or always use 
the litigation date—the measurement date should be chosen behind a “veil of ignorance.” 
The existence of a firm rule is more important than the content of the rule. Otherwise, the 
parties would invoke the rule more favorable to them at the time of the trial and the court 
would have little guidance in choosing between the proffered measures.  
 
Having said that, I will proceed by choosing the breach date as the appropriate 
date. The advantage is that the party contemplating nonperformance will find it easier to 
weigh the costs and benefits of going forward. I recognize that some courts and 
commentators object strongly to the notion that breach is an option. I have suggested 
elsewhere that it is useful in this context to think of the damage remedy as the price of the 
implicit termination option.
8
 Using the breach date makes the price more transparent, 
making the decision easier. (Determining that price can still be very difficult, a point that 
will become clear in Parts III and IV.)  
 
The first two patterns have received substantial treatment in the literature. 
Surprisingly, significant scholars, notably J. J. White and Robert Summers in their 
                                                 
6
 Suppose that the real price of Widgetco stock remained constant between the breach date and the 
litigation date. And suppose further that there was substantial inflation so that the nominal price went up 
20%. If the prejudgment interest rate reflected that inflation rate, awarding Brown her breach date damages 
($6,000) would be equivalent to awarding her the litigation date damages ($7,200). 
7
 So, for example in Kenford v. Erie County, the litigation lasted eighteen years in an era which included 
some years in which the prime rate exceeded 20%; however, the statutory prejudgment interest rate was 
only 3%. See Rethinking, ch. 9 
8
 See Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 Columbia L. Rev. 1033, 1049-1054 (2014) and Rethinking, 16-21 
(2015). See also Robert Scott and George Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation 
in Contract Law, 104 Columbia L. Rev. 1428 (2004). 
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treatise, have rejected the breach-date rule.
9
 With regard to the first, they argue that there 
is a conflict between the UCC remedies for a buyer’s breach. Section 2-706 allows the 
seller to resell the goods (to cover) while Section 2-708(1) gives the contract-market 
differential. Properly conceived, there is no conflict, as I will show in Section I. With 
regard to the second, White and Summers assert that “[m]easuring buyer’s damages 
under 2-713 upon an anticipatory repudiation presents one of the most impenetrable 
interpretive problems in the entire Code.”10 The difficulties, as we shall see in Section II, 
arise because of a failure to adopt the breach-date rule. Not all the commentary has 
followed the White & Summers position. Robert Scott
11
 argued for the breach-date rule 
regarding the first pattern a generation ago and Tom Jackson
12
 did the same for 
anticipatory repudiation even earlier. My analysis of these two cases parallels theirs. 
Sections I and II will be devoted to these two problems. 
 
The third pattern, which has attracted much less scholarly attention, raises a 
number of problems not present in the first two.  How, if at all, should the damage 
measurement take account of possible losses that might occur post-decision? Should 
damages for breach of an installment be determined in the same manner as an 
anticipatory repudiation? In a take-or-pay or minimum quantity contract, should there be 
different damage theories for a failure to take as opposed to an anticipatory repudiation of 
the contract? The case law, particularly regarding take-or-pay contracts, has been 
extremely muddled. In Section III, I will clarify the issues. Central to the argument is that 
for an anticipatory repudiation the focus should be on the change in the value of the 
contract at the time of the breach. The analysis will also shed light on a classic casebook 
case— Lake River v. Carborundum.13 
 
To get a better handle on ascertaining damages in long-term contracts, it is useful 
to unpack the Widgetco hypothetical. Where does the June 1 share price of $16 come 
from? Widgetco’s value is not a function of the past; it depends on projecting earnings 
into the future. All sorts of things might happen that will affect Widgetco’s future 
earnings. Recessions, inflation, war, market shifts, currency fluctuations, pestilence, the 
health of key personnel, oil embargos, and expropriations all might affect the value of 
Widgetco. Its current market price reflects the collective best guess as to the likelihood 
and impact of all of these and any other contingencies. That is, all the uncertainty about 
the future has been incorporated into a single number: the price. The same methodology 
can be applied when estimating damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a twenty-year 
take-or-pay contract or an expropriation of an oil concession with many years yet to run. 
The future path of costs, prices, demand, and the many factors alluded to above would 
also make the future value of the contract uncertain. The inquiry would concern the 
                                                 
9
 James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (5
th
 ed.). I will note my 
disagreements with their analysis throughout the paper. 
10
 §6.7. 
11
 Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. of Chicago L. 
Rev. 1155(1990). 
12
 Thomas H. Jackson, “‘Anticipatory Repudiation’ And The Temporal Element Of Contract Law: An 
Economic Inquiry Into Contract Damages In Cases Of Prospective Nonperformance,” 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69. 
13
 769 F. 2d 1284 (7
th
 Cir. 1985). 
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change in the price of a single asset—the contract—at the time of the event (breach, 
repudiation, or expropriation). I do not mean to suggest that it would be easy. But the 
principle is important. The argument will be developed in Section III (long-term 
contracts) and Section IV (international investment arbitrations). 
 
Throughout this paper, I will refer to the damage measure as the market-contract 
price differential. Since, in practice, there will often not be an actual market price, it 
might be better to label this the “current-contract” price differential. The reader should 
feel free to use the two interchangeably. 
 
I. THE SELLER’S REMEDY FOR BREACH 
 
In a contract for the sale of goods, when the buyer breaches, the UCC provides 
two alternative remedies and that has led to some confusion.
14
 Section 2-706 allows the 
seller to resell the goods (to cover), and reckons the damages as the difference between 
the contract price and the price at which the goods were sold. Section 2-708(1) provides 
for the market-contract differential. If at the time of a buyer breach the market price had 
fallen, the buyer’s liability would be the market-contract differential. But suppose that the 
market price subsequently rose and the seller resold the goods at a price greater than the 
contract price. Some commentators would argue that the seller had not suffered a loss at 
all. They perceive a conflict between 708 and 706, arguing that allowing recovery of the 
contract-market differential would give the seller a windfall. White and Summers, while 
noting that the UCC is unclear, opt for restricting recovery: “Whether the drafters 
intended a seller who has resold to recover more in damages under 2-708(1) than he 
could recover under 2-706 is not clear. We conclude that a seller should not be permitted 
to recover more under 2-708(1) than under 2-706, but we admit we are swimming 
upstream against a heavy current of implication which flows from the comments and the 
Code history.”15 Some courts and other commentators have joined White and Summers in 
their concern about a possible windfall.
16
 Robert Scott
17
 debunked the idea over two 
decades ago, but it still hangs on. I will have another go at it here. 
 
Some jurisdictions have taken the position that awarding the contract-market 
differential could overcompensate sellers. Consider a simple example. Widgetco 
promises to sell to Buildco 1,000 tons of widgets for delivery on January 1 for $100,000. 
On January 1, Buildco breaches and the market value is $70,000. Damages? $30,000. 
But, Buildco argues, Widgetco didn’t sell right away; it held the widgets for four more 
years, ultimately selling them for $120,000. Citing 2-706, Buildco claims that the resale 
                                                 
14 Specific performance is typically not available in the United States for sales contracts. Specific 
performance coupled with a constructive trust would be equivalent to awarding damages determined at the 
time of performance. 
15
 James J. White and Robert S. Summers Uniform Commercial Code (6
th
 ed. 2010), p. 362. 
16
 See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979, Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
v. Holborn Oil Co., Ltd., 145 Misc.2d 715, 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 10 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 814, and Eades 
Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper, 825 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. Ct. 1992); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Conflicting Formulas For Measuring Expectation Damages, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 369, 398-399 and Jennifer S. 
Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming) 
17
 Robert E. Scott, supra note 11. 
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should be taken into account and that Widgetco didn’t lose $30,000 after all. 
Compensating it that amount would mean that Widgetco would net $50,000, which 
would be a windfall. So goes the argument. 
 
 The widgets four years hence might well be physically identical, but they are not 
economically identical. At the moment of breach, Widgetco has lost an asset, the right to 
the net proceeds of sale on January 1. In this case it happens to be a positive amount,  
$30,000. The right to sell widgets on January 1 is not the same as the right to sell 
physically identical widgets at some subsequent date. Awarding Widgetco $30,000 puts it 
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. However, in addition to 
the $30,000 it would still have the widgets, which would be worth $30,000 less than they 
were when the contract was formed. Had it in fact sold the widgets at the market price at 
the moment of breach, Widgetco would be in exactly the same position as if the contract 
had been performed (ignoring the costs of both finding a new buyer and litigation).  
 
After January 1, it would be free to buy, sell, or use widgets or any other assets. 
The subsequent course of prices of widgets (or any other assets) bears no relation to what 
it had lost at the time of the buyer’s breach. If it held the widgets, it bore the risk of 
subsequent price changes. Suppose that in the four years following January 1 it had, at 
various dates, bought and sold physically identical widgets. The prices of those 
transactions are as relevant to its damage award as the prices of Widgetco stock or any 
other assets it might have bought or sold in that subsequent period—namely, no relevance 
at all. The simple point is this: If the market price information is easily available, the 
quest for the remedy should be over. If the seller decides to hold, use, eat, or resell the 
item, that ought to be of no concern to the breaching buyer.
18
 
 
For an amusing example of the correct treatment of the issue in a non-UCC 
context, see Kearl v. Rausser,
19
 a double-barreled battle of the experts. One group of 
economic experts was suing another expert for breach of contract and the experts 
presented conflicting expert opinions on the damages. The issue concerned the valuation 
of shares of stock.
20
 After the breach, the stock price had risen and the defendant 
(Rausser) had sold shares at various dates at prices above the price on the date of breach. 
The plaintiffs won a jury verdict based on the post-breach sale prices; the Court of 
Appeals reversed. “Instead of seeking to measure their losses as of the date of Dr. 
Rausser’s breach, plaintiffs were free under the jury instructions given to argue for 
damages months and even years after any possible breach date. Indeed, plaintiffs’ 
damages theory valued the stock as of the dates of Dr. Rausser’s sales and, for the stock 
he retained, the date of trial.”21 
 
                                                 
18
 For a similar argument, see Henry Gabriel, The Seller's Election of Remedies Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 429 (1988).  
19
 293 Fed.Appx. 592 (2008). 
20
 When Rausser moved his practice to Charles River Associates (CRA), part of his compensation was a 
forgivable loan to buy shares of CRA stock. He, in turn, promised to share some of the stock with other 
economists he brought to CRA. The dispute was over how many shares of CRA stock Rausser had 
promised the plaintiffs and the valuation of that stock. Id. 
21
 Id. at 605. 
 6 
If the market price were not so easily available, then the proceeds of resale might 
come into play. Rather than treat 2-706 as an alternative or coequal remedy, it is more 
useful to view it as a possible source of evidence of the market price at the time of the 
breach.
22
 The persuasiveness of the evidence from a subsequent resale would depend on 
the temporal proximity and on the availability of other evidence. If the seller were to 
resell promptly that would be good evidence of the market price and the burden should be 
on the buyer to show that the sale price was unreasonable. If the market were thin, this 
would be especially important and the buyer’s proof burden should be high. So, for 
example, in a well-known casebook case, Columbia Nitrogen’s claim that Royster resold 
its fertilizer at too low a price should have been met with great skepticism.
23
 The four 
years in the hypothetical should certainly not qualify as reasonable evidence. 
 
How does this play out in practice? The Oregon Supreme Court was faced with 
the problem in a recent case, Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds 
Marketing, Inc.
24
 The seller of grass seed was an agricultural cooperative of grass seed 
producers. It entered into a number of fixed price contracts with a single buyer to sell 
fungible seeds over a two-year period. The buyer was to provide shipping and delivery 
instructions. The market price fell and the buyer refused to provide shipping instructions. 
After buyer’s continued refusal, seller cancelled the contracts; the court concluded that 
the buyer had breached and all that was left was the determination of damages. There is 
no discussion in the case as to whether the performance date for all the contracts had 
passed. The court focused on a single contract and I will do likewise. 
 
The contract price was 72 cents per pound. The market price at that time of the 
breach was 64 cents, so under 2-708 the damages would be eight cents per pound. 
However, “[o]ver the next three years, plaintiff was able to sell at least some of the seed 
that defendant had agreed to purchase to other buyers.”25 Some of the contract seed, the 
buyer claimed, was sold at 75 cents per pound. The decision does not make clear when in 
that three-year period the seed was sold. The buyer argued that if the seller were awarded 
the eight cents it would receive a windfall, since it would also receive the extra three 
cents from the subsequent sale. To further confuse the matter, the court noted that the 
seller claimed that some of the seed had been sold at 60 cents, which would have resulted 
in a higher measure of damages. Thus, it appears, that over the course of the three years 
                                                 
22
 Ellen Peters suggested this many years ago: “much of 2-706 should therefore be evidentiary rather than 
directory, a possible but not a necessary reading of the section as now drafted.” Ellen A. Peters, Remedies 
For Breach Of Contracts Relating To The Sale Of Goods Under The Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Roadmap For Article Two, 73 Yale L. J. 199, 256 (1963). However, she also noted: “Though the Code 
favors substitute transactions, it does not compel them. In their absence, the Code reconstructs, with some 
variations, the time-honored market-contract differentials as bases for recovery.” (footnotes omitted) Id. At 
pp. 257-58.  
23
 See Victor P. Goldberg, Framing Contract Law: An Economic Perspective.  (2006), pp. 272-73. 
(Critiquing Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster Co. 451 F. 2d 3(4
th
 Cir.1971)) 
24
 355 Or. 44 (2014). Why this case? At a recent conference a contracts professor gave this as an example 
of an erroneous decision. I disagreed. Given her persistence, I decided to dig further into the case. For her 
take on the case, see Jennifer Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the Uniform Commercial Code, U. of 
Illinois Law Rev, 2016. (forthcoming) 
25
 Id. at 47. In Peace River’s brief it referred to sales over a four-year period. Plaintiff Brief at __. 
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there were a number of sales of seed at different prices. The seller could have sold the 
seeds at the market price (64 cents) at the time of the breach, but chose not to. 
 
The question was: should any (or all) of these different prices be recognized when 
reckoning damages? The trial court chose to recognize at least some of these prices, 
thereby favoring the buyer. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals and the 
Oregon Supreme Court upheld that decision. The Supreme Court based part of its 
conclusion on a comparison of buyer and seller remedies under the Code. For sellers the 
available remedies are resale price damages and market price damages. The court noted: 
“it lists those remedies without any limiting conjunction, such as ‘or,’ that might suggest 
that the remedies are mutually exclusive.”26 The buyer’s remedy, however, only allows 
for cover or damages for nondelivery. “Thus, although the buyer’s index of remedies 
suggests that a buyer who covers may be precluded from seeking market price damages, 
the seller’s index of remedies does not contain a similar limitation if the seller chooses to 
resell.”27 This emphasis on conjunctions exemplifies the confused way the court tackles 
what turns out to be a simple problem. The issue was not grammar; it was economics. 
 
The disposition of the goods would be relevant only if the market price 
information were not easily ascertainable. A subsequent sale (or purchase) might provide 
reasonable evidence of the market price at the time of the breach. The closer in time to 
the breach, the more plausible the notion that the sale price would be the market price. 
For complex goods that are not frequently traded, for example multi-year time charters, 
the time between breach and ascertaining the market price might be measured in weeks or 
months. For items sold in fairly thick markets, for example, grass seed, the period might 
be measured in days or hours. In Peace River it appears that there were subsequent sales 
at different prices spread over a three-year period.
28
  
 
If the remedy were based on resale, the parties would identify the sales most 
favorable to their position. As Ellen Peters noted, it is easy to manipulate damages when 
the seller deals regularly with the market: 
 
 The buyer or seller who, by the nature of his business enterprise, 
constantly enters into new contracts for related goods and services in a 
market where prices fluctuate broadly and abruptly, will have a wide range 
of alternatives to substitute for the contract in default. It is only realistic to 
expect injured claimants to allocate as a substitute contract that which 
gives rise to the largest amount by way of damages. 
*** 
It would be a most unusual seller who could not use these openings to 
create a number of alternative substitutes with which to play.
29
 
 
                                                 
26
 355 Or. 44 (2014) at 55. 
27
Id. 
28
 In its Brief, Peace River suggested that it sold some, but not all, the seeds in four years “before the seed 
expired and became a liability.” Plaintiff Brief, supra note 25 at pg. 4. 
29
 Ellen Peters, supra note 22 at 257 
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In its brief, Peace River recognized that at the time of the breach it could, but need 
not, resell immediately and that if it failed to do so, it would bear the risk: 
 
Because the law treats the contract as terminated without any transfer of 
ownership, the seller remains the owner of the goods. The seller may deal 
with the goods as it sees fit. The seller may sell the commodities 
immediately at the “market price” and take the cash. Alternatively, the 
seller may keep the goods for its own use; hold the commodities for later 
sale hoping that the price will go up, but taking the risk that the price will 
go down; or (as Peace River apparently did in part here) largely hold them 
until they lose all their value.
30
  
 
 It also described one way of ascertaining the market price at the time of the 
breach: 
 
Peace River presented unopposed testimony that the custom in the 
industry allowed parties to similar contracts to enter into “wash” 
transactions under which the seller pretends that it ships the seed and gets 
the contract price, and the breaching buyer resells the seed to the seller at 
the current market price. In essence, they “wash” the obligation to ship 
both ways and the breaching buyer pays just the difference between the 
contract and market price, plus incidental damages. [UCC § 2-708(1)] 
precisely matches that custom. Proseeds itself entered into a three-way 
“wash” transaction that gave Peace River the difference between its 
contract price and market price. Doing so acknowledges the custom Peace 
River’s evidence established.31 
 
The wash transaction simply replicated the time-of-the-breach remedy. The only 
concern would have been whether the market at the time was so thin that the 
seller could behave opportunistically, claiming a wash price that was more 
favorable to it than a neutral estimate of the market price. 
 
The value of the contract at the time of the breach was determined by the 
contract-market differential at that point of time. If the seller did not dispose of the seeds 
in a timely manner, it bore the risk of subsequent price changes. Properly conceived, 
there was no conflict between 2-706 and 2-708(1). Whether a particular resale did reflect 
the market price at the time of the breach would have been a fact question.  And the court 
should have concluded that the price of grass seed three years after the breach was stale 
information.   
 
 Neither the decisions nor the Briefs in Peace River dealt with the 
possibility that when Peace River cancelled the remaining deliveries (that is, when 
the buyer breached), the due dates for performance in those contracts were 
subsequent to the cancellation. That is, what if the buyer anticipatorily repudiated 
                                                 
30
 Plaintiff Brief, supra note 25 at p. 16.  
31
 Id. 
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the contract. That would add a new problem but the principle would remain the 
same. Suppose that the breach date was January 1 and at the time of the breach 
one of the contracts had a delivery date six months later. The relevant market 
price would be the forward price, the price on January 1 for the goods with a 
delivery date of June 1. It might turn out that the forward price could not be 
ascertained directly and the courts might have to resort to other observable prices 
as evidence—perhaps the market price on either January 1 or June 1 and resale 
prices at or near those dates might be the best evidence, but we should not lose 
sight of the basic principle. I will elaborate on that in the next Part. 
 
II.  Anticipatory repudiation 
 
In this Part, I consider the case in which the court’s decision would come after the 
final date of performance, so the court would have access to all post-termination 
information. I defer to Part III the case in which at least some of the performance would 
have been due after the decision date.
32
 Should damages be assessed as of the date the 
repudiation was accepted, the date that performance was due, or some other date? The 
law and commentary has been mixed. I will argue that damages should be reckoned at the 
moment when the repudiation has been accepted (or deemed accepted).  
Pre-Code cases generally opted for the time-of-performance. Missouri Furnace 
Co. v. Cochran
33
 is a typical pre-Code case. The seller had promised to deliver coke at 
$1.20 per ton on a daily basis for a full year. The market price rose dramatically and less 
than two months after performance had begun the seller rescinded the contract. The buyer 
then immediately entered into a cover contract for the remainder of the year at $4.00 per 
ton (the market rate for a forward contract on that date). However, the market price soon 
fell to $1.30 per ton. The buyer’s claim for damages was based on the cover price of 
$4.00, but the court awarded damages on the basis of the spot price of coke on each of the 
delivery dates. By covering, held the court, the buyer took a risk: “The good faith of the 
plaintiff in entering into the new contract cannot be questioned, but it proved a most 
unfortunate venture. . . . As the plaintiff was not bound to enter into the new forward 
contract, it seems to me it did so at its own risk, and cannot fairly claim that the damages 
chargeable against the defendant shall be assessed on the basis of that contract.”34 
                                                 
32 One issue that can arise in anticipatory repudiation cases is how a court should take into account facts 
that are learned post-repudiation. Suppose, for example, that the contract included a force majeure clause 
that allowed a party to terminate the contract; and suppose further that some time after the repudiation had 
been accepted the force majeure event occurred. Should the damage assessment take that new information 
into account? This question has received considerable attention in England in the last decade. See Golden 
Strait Corpn v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) 2005 WL 290997, and Bunge SA v. 
Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43. Unfortunately, the court held in both cases that the post-repudiation facts 
should be taken into account. I have argued elsewhere that their treatment of the question was a mistake; 
see “After The Golden Victory: Still Lost at Sea,” The Journal of International Maritime Law. I will not, 
therefore, pursue the question further here. 
33
 8 F. 463 (1881). For a critical analysis of the decision, see Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 12 
34
 8 F. 463 (1881) at 467. To make matters worse for the buyer it “had in its hands more coke than was 
required in its business, and it procured—at what precise loss does not clearly appear— the cancellation of 
contracts with Hutchinson [the cover contracts] to the extent of 20,000 tons.” Id. 
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  Some post-Code cases have followed this path. I will consider two that illustrate 
different ways in which the courts have done so. In Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford,
35
 the seller 
repudiated a sale of wheat. The buyer, Cargill, claimed damages based on the date at 
which Cargill accepted the repudiation (September 6) and the trial court accepted that. 
However, in interpreting the 2-713 language, “when the buyer learned of the breach,” the 
Court of Appeals concluded that this meant “time of performance.” In part it relied on 
pre-Code precedent—“a clear deviation from past law would not ordinarily be 
accomplished by Code ambiguities.”36 It also relied on the fact that 2-723, which deals 
with repudiations in which some of the performance would be due after the court’s 
decision, explicitly referred to the time of repudiation, whereas 2-713 did not. This 
semantic argument shows up in other cases and in the White and Summers treatise as 
well.
37
 
Then the argument gets really odd. The court asserts that the remedy would 
depend on whether or not there was a valid reason for the buyer not covering.  
 
We conclude that under § 4-2-713 a buyer may urge continued 
performance for a reasonable time. At the end of a reasonable period he 
should cover if substitute goods are readily available. If substitution is 
readily available and buyer does not cover within a reasonable time, 
damages should be based on the price at the end of that reasonable time 
rather than on the price when performance is due. If a valid reason exists 
for failure or refusal to cover, damages may be calculated from the time 
when performance is due.
38
 
 
This reflects the notion that cover is a separate remedy, rather than merely 
evidence of the price at the time of the breach (accepted repudiation). The court 
remanded, holding that “[i]f Cargill did not have a valid reason, the court’s award based 
on the September 6 price should be reinstated. If Cargill had a valid reason for not 
covering, damages should be awarded on the difference between the price on September 
30, the last day for performance, and the July 31 contract price.”39 So, depending on what 
had happened to the  price in the interim, the parties could argue over whether Cargill had 
covered, if it had, which transaction was the cover transaction, and if not, over the 
validity of Cargill’s reason. Did Cargill cover? The court says: “The record contains 
scant, if any, evidence that Cargill covered the wheat.”40 And again: “The record does not 
show that Cargill covered or attempted to cover. Nothing in the record shows the 
continued availability or nonavailability of substitute wheat.”41 And so the case was 
remanded to determine whether Cargill had a valid reason for failing to cover. Cargill, of 
course, was (and still is) a major player in a thick market. It engages in numerous wheat 
                                                 
35
 553 F.2d 1222 (1977). 
36 Id. at 1226. 
37 See, for example, Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co. Ltd., 338 F.3d 357, 363 (2003); see, also, White 
and Summers, (§6.7). 
38 553 F.2d 1222 (1977 at 1227. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at1226. 
41 
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transactions every day. It makes no sense to identify any particular trade as the cover 
contract. So, unless the wheat market somehow disappeared on or around September 6, 
substitute wheat would have been readily available. To even ask whether Cargill covered 
makes no sense, and it makes even less sense to ask whether the reason for not covering 
was valid or invalid. Despite the fact that the court appeared to adopt the “time of 
performance” measure, given its garbled treatment of the cover question, on remand a 
court could just as well find that (a) a substitute was readily available, (b) Cargill didn’t 
have a reason for not covering, and, therefore, (c) the appropriate date would have been 
the time of repudiation. Or not. Note that the trial court and Cargill used the spot price of 
wheat on September 6, not the forward price. I will return to this point. 
 
In Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co. Ltd.,
42
 the seller of natural gas, 
Lightning, repudiated its agreement. In its defense Lightning made a common fallacious 
argument, confusing a risen price ex post with a rising price ex ante. Hess, it claimed, 
“sat idly by during a period of time when they knew the price [of natural gas] was going 
up, up, up, up, up, up.”43 The court ignored this, but, using the same semantic argument 
as in Cargill, concluded that the Code required that it use the time of performance.
44
 The 
case introduced one new complication—Hess’s use of the futures market to avoid price 
risk. The court argued that this would affect how damages should be measured.
45
  
 
To understand why this would be wrong, it is useful to first reproduce the court’s 
description of Hess’s use of the futures market: 
 
Hess’ business was to purchase natural gas from entities like Lightning . . . 
and, once it did so, to locate commercial customers to which it could sell 
the natural gas. Hess’ business was not to profit on speculation that it 
could resell the purchased natural gas at higher prices based on favorable 
market swings, but rather to profit on mark-ups attributable to its 
transportation and other services provided to the end user of the natural 
gas. Because Hess entered into gas purchase contracts often at prices fixed 
well in advance of the execution date, it exposed itself to the serious risk 
that the market price of natural gas on the agreed-to purchase date would 
                                                 
42
 338 F.3d 357 (2003). 
43
 Id.at 361.  
44
 Id.at 363. The Second Circuit made a similar argument in Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 
769 F.2d 902 (1985), in which the buyer repudiated a contract for the sale of 1,000 metric tons per month 
of aluminum: 
We would accept Southwire’s argument that the date Trans World learned of the 
repudiation would be the correct date on which to calculate the market price had this 
action been tried before the time for full performance under the contract. See N.Y.U.C.C. 
§ 2-723(1) (market price at time aggrieved party learned of repudiation used to calculate 
damages in action for anticipatory repudiation that “comes to trial before time for 
performance with respect to some or all of the goods”). However, where damages are 
awarded after the time for full performance, as in this case, the calculation of damages 
under section 2-708(1) should reflect the actual market price at each successive date 
when tender was to have been made under the repudiated installment contract. (emphasis 
in original, at 909) 
    
45
 338 F.3d 357 (2003). 
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have fallen, leaving it in the position of having to pay a higher price for 
the natural gas than it could sell the gas for, even after its service-related 
mark-up. To hedge against this market risk, at each time it agreed to 
purchase natural gas from a supplier at a fixed price for delivery on a 
specific date, it also entered into a NYMEX futures contract to sell the 
same quantity of natural gas on the same date for the same fixed price. 
According to ordinary commodities trading practice, on the settlement 
date of the futures contract, Hess would not actually sell the natural gas to 
the other party to the futures contract but rather would simply pay any loss 
or receive any gain on the contract in a cash settlement. In making this 
arrangement, Hess made itself indifferent to fluctuations in the price of 
natural gas because settlement of the futures contract offset any favorable 
or unfavorable swings in the market price of natural gas on the date of 
delivery, allowing Hess to eliminate market risk and rest its profitability 
solely on its transportation and delivery service.
46
 
 
By Lightning defaulting on the first half of the paired transactions, argued the 
court, it exposed Hess to the price risk that it had attempted to avoid. White and Summers 
enthusiastically endorse this opinion “In affirming Hess’ jury verdict . . . the Fourth 
Circuit agrees with our interpretation and arguments . . . for the proposition that 2-713 
measures the contract market difference at the time of delivery not at the time of 
repudiation in a repudiation case. Hurray for Judge Niemeyer.”47 However, the court 
failed to recognize that if the remedy were based on the forward price at the time of the 
accepted repudiation, then Hess’s neutral hedge position would have been maintained. 
Hess could have closed out its position at the then current price for future delivery. By 
using that price, Hess would have received the change in the value of the contract at the 
moment the repudiation was accepted. If Hess chose not to do so, it would bear the risk 
of subsequent price changes. 
 
In other cases, courts have used the time of repudiation in determining damages.
48
 
In Oloffson v. Coomer,
49
 a farmer (Coomer) promised in April to sell 40,000 bushels of 
corn to a grain dealer for delivery in October and December. However, in June Coomer 
informed Oloffson that, because the season had been too wet, he would not be planting 
any corn. The contract price was about $1.12 and the price for future delivery at that time 
was $1.16. The market price rose substantially in the months after the repudiation. 
Oloffson ultimately purchased corn at much higher prices after the delivery dates had 
passed ($1.35 and $1.49) and argued that its damages should be based on those prices. 
The court held that, given the nature of the market, a commercially reasonable time to 
await performance was less than a day and used the forward price at the time of 
repudiation ($1.16) when calculating damages.
50
 Professor Jackson, using Oloffson to 
                                                 
46
 Id. at 359. 
47
 White and Summers, supra note 15 at 325-326 
48
 See Trinidad Bean and Elevator Co. v. Frosh, 1 Neb.App. 281 (1992); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. 
Jefferson Mortg. Co., 576 F.2d 479 (1978. 
49
 11 Ill.App.3d 918 (1973). 
50
 “Since Coomer’s statement to Oloffson on June 3, 1970, was unequivocal and since ‘cover’ easily and 
immediately was available to Oloffson in the well-organized and easily accessible market for purchases of 
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illustrate his argument, asserted that “contract law presumptively should adopt a general 
rule that an aggrieved buyer should cover at the forward price as of the date of the 
repudiation.”51 
 
While this is essentially the same position I have taken, Oloffson does raise one 
problem. The court noted that Oloffson had argued that he “adhered to a usage of trade 
that permitted his customers to cancel the contract for a future delivery of grain by 
making known to him a desire to cancel and paying to him the difference between the 
contract and market price on the day of cancellation.”52 That would have meant using the 
spot price ($1.12) in determining damages. The court rejected this because, it claimed, 
Coomer did not know of the alleged usage, and good faith required that Oloffson inform 
him of that usage. Remarkably, White and Summers get this completely wrong. Their 
preferred result is the time of performance, but they reluctantly concede that “[t]he 
outcome of the case can be defended only on the ground that the contract was implicitly 
modified by the trade usage that prevailed in the corn market.”53 But, as noted, the court 
rejected the trade usage (spot price) and chose instead the forward price. Their 
preference, price at the time of performance, wasn’t even in the running.  
To call this a trade usage might be an understatement. In Cargill, Cargill had 
included in its confirmation a statement that the contract was subject to the rules of the 
National Grain and Feed Dealers Association (NGFDA). Stafford tried to argue that this 
additional term destroyed enforceability. The court, however, held that the contract was 
enforceable, but that the NGFDA clause was not part of the contract.
54
 The court only 
said that the contract was not subject to the Rules of the NGFDA, but it did not say what 
those rules were. The rule today, Rule 28 A (3), is, no doubt, the same as it was when 
Cargill (and Oloffson) were decided: “cancel the defaulted portion of the contract at fair 
market value based on the close of the market the next business day.”55 So, it appears that 
the standard rule in the grain trade (when courts are willing to recognize it) is to use the 
spot price, not the forward price.
56
 The fact that the NGFDA rule was not recognized in 
both Cargill and Oloffson suggests that the barriers to contracting out of the default rule 
might not be trivial.
57
  
                                                                                                                                                 
grain to be delivered in the future, it would be unreasonable for Oloffson on June 3, 1970, to have awaited 
Coomer’s performance.” Id. at 922. 
51
 Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 12 at 94 
52
 11 Ill.App.3d 918 (1973) at 922. The court does not say how this characterization would have helped 
Oloffson. I presume that Oloffson’s argument would have been that Coomer had failed to follow the proper 
procedure to make known its desire to cancel.  
53
 White and Summers, supra note 15 at §6.3 
54
 It used a standard 2-207 battle of the forms analysis. 
55
 NGFA Grain Trade Rules. 
56
 This is not just a matter of wily grain traders attempting to take advantage of naïve farmers. In Nat'l 
Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 560 F.2d 1350, 1353 (8th Cir. 1977), the roles were reversed; the 
farmers’ cooperative claimed that the buyer had repudiated and it immediately brought “all outstanding 
contracts we have with your office to current market price.”  
57
 Even for significant transactions, parties often end up with a battle of the forms as they did in Cargill. In 
Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902 (1985) (see supra note 44), for example, the 
transaction was for more than $20 million, but it was memorialized only by two conflicting forms.  
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Why the spot rather than the forward price? I would speculate that as a general 
rule, the spot price of grains would be easier to identify since forward contracts that have 
the identical termination date might not always be available. The spot price would be a 
proxy for the forward price. The important thing is that there be a clear rule ex ante. 
Given the court’s treatment in the two decisions, the rule might turn out to be not so 
clear, ex post. 
As a final example, consider Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl O. Helm 
Aktiengesellschaft.
58
 Cosden, a producer of polystyrene, promised to deliver the product 
over a period of time to Helm, a trader. It delivered some, but because of production 
problems, it cancelled the remaining orders. Anticipating the problem, Helm engaged in 
self-help, withholding payment for the polystyrene that had been delivered. Cosden sued 
for payment and Helm counterclaimed for the failure to deliver the remainder of its order. 
The jury found that Cosden had anticipatorily repudiated. The price of polystyrene had 
risen throughout the post-repudiation period. 
 
The main issue on appeal was which date should be used to determine the market 
price. The court considered three dates: “Cosden argues that damages should be 
measured when Helm learned of the repudiation. Helm contends that market price as of 
the last day for delivery—or the time of performance—should be used to compute its 
damages under the contract-market differential. We reject both views, and hold that the 
district court correctly measured damages at a commercially reasonable point after 
Cosden informed Helm that it was cancelling the [order].”59  
 
The learned-of-repudiation date was properly rejected since the anticipatory 
repudiation doctrine gives the aggrieved party a reasonable period of time during which it 
can decide whether it should accept the repudiation. It should have enough time to weigh 
alternatives. The repudiation does not become a breach until it is accepted (or should 
have been accepted). For commodities traded in thick markets (as in Cargill and 
Oloffson), the time period might be measured in minutes—for others, like polystyrene, 
the period would be longer. So, there were really only two choices. By rejecting the time-
of-performance, Cosden is consistent with Oloffson.  
 
There are three things worth noting about the decision. First, the court implies that 
the parties knew they were in a “rising market,”60 not recognizing the difference between 
a rising market and a risen market.
61
 As I have emphasized, the parties do not know what 
the subsequent price path will be. Second, the court found the relevant price to be the spot 
price at the time the repudiation was deemed accepted, not the forward price. There was 
no discussion of the question and there was no indication that the two prices might have 
                                                 
58
 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984). 
59
 Id. at 1069. 
60
 “Allowing the aggrieved buyer a commercially reasonable time, however, provides him with an 
opportunity to investigate his cover possibilities in a rising market without fear that, if he is unsuccessful in 
obtaining cover, he will be relegated to a market-contract damage remedy measured at the time of 
repudiation.” (Id. at 1072) 
61
 Recall Lightning’s claim that Hess “knew the price [of natural gas] was going up, up, up, up, up, up.” See 
supra note 43. 
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been different. In this instance, it seems more likely than in the grain cases, that it would 
have been more difficult to ascertain the forward price.  
 
The third is how the parties and the court treated “cover.” Both parties identified 
particular transactions in the pre-decision period as cover transactions, Helm choosing 
those close to the performance date (the higher price) and Cosden those closer to the 
repudiation date: 
 
At trial Cosden argued that Helm's purchases of polystyrene from other 
sources in early February constituted cover. Helm argued that those 
purchases were not intended to substitute for polystyrene sales cancelled 
by Cosden. Helm, however, contended that it did cover by purchasing 
large amounts of high impact polystyrene from other sources late in 
February and around the first of March. Cosden claimed that these 
purchases were not made reasonably and that they should not qualify as 
cover. The jury found that none of Helm's purchases of polystyrene from 
other sources were cover purchases. 
*   *   * 
 
We cannot isolate a reason to explain the jury's finding: it might have 
concluded that Helm would have made the purchases regardless of 
Cosden's nonperformance or that the transactions did not qualify as cover 
for other reasons. Because of the jury's finding, we cannot use those other 
transactions to determine Helm's damages.
62
 
 
It is not surprising that the parties would identify the cover contracts that were most 
favorable to them. What is unfortunate is that this would be treated as a fact question. It 
reflects the notion that cover is a remedy that is alternative to the contract/market 
differential, rather than possible evidence of the price at the time of the breach. Helm, 
like Cargill, was a trader engaging in numerous transactions. To ask which of them was 
the cover contract presents the jury with a futile task. If the buyer did engage in 
subsequent transactions, the only question the jury should care about is whether details of 
those transactions would be useful in ascertaining the market price (spot or forward) at 
the time of the breach.
63
  
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty in determining the damages. Even in 
the fairly thick markets I have discussed in this and the previous Part there were 
problems. And if the market were thin there would be further difficulties. In Laredo 
Hides Co., Inc. v. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc.,
64 for example, the contract was a 
variable output contract for all the hides H&H produced as a byproduct of its 
meatpacking business, with nine months yet to go on the contract when the seller 
                                                 
62
 At 1076. 
63
 Recall Judge Peters’ argument (see supra  note 29) that it would be easy to manipulate damages by the 
appropriate choice of a substitute contract. 
64
 513 S.W.2d 210 (1974). In The Golden Victory (see supra note 32) the repudiation was of a multi-year 
charter with a base price that would change over time, a profit-sharing clause, and, of course, a force 
majeure clause allowing either party to terminate. 
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repudiated. Laredo claimed that because hides decomposed with age, it had to take the 
hides on a month-to-month basis. To determine the cover price, the court used the actual 
hide production of H&H in each month and applied the then current market price. 
Although that required looking at post-repudiation data, it might have been a reasonable 
method for determining the change in the value of the contract. The complexity is 
ratcheted up when dealing with long-term contracts, the subject of the next two Sections. 
 
III. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 
 
If a buyer were to repudiate a twenty-year contract in year 3, how should damages 
be reckoned? To further complicate the picture, often neither the price nor the quantity is 
fixed. The price might be indexed or subject to renegotiation; the agreement might even 
include a gross inequity, or hardship, clause which would allow a disgruntled party to 
appeal to an arbitrator or court to reset the price. The contract might have a mechanism 
that would allow one of the parties to terminate the agreement under certain 
circumstances. The quantity could be determined by the buyer (requirements contract) or 
seller (output contract). The contract might include a take-or-pay or minimum quantity 
clause, and that might be modified with a makeup clause. 
 
I think it fair to say that neither the UCC nor the courts have been very good at 
dealing with these situations. “The drafters of the 1950’s probably did not contemplate 20 
or 30 year contracts,” say White and Summers, “but they clearly contemplated contracts 
where performance would occur after the time for trial. Section 2-723 is designed to deal 
with at least one issue in such cases. It instructs the court to base damages on the ‘market 
price’ at the date that the aggrieved party learns of the repudiation.”65 White and 
Summers interpret this to mean that “section 2-723 must be read to measure both the 
contract and the market price at the time the aggrieved party learned of the 
repudiation.”66 They would then use those prices for the duration of the contract. That is, 
if the contract price at the time of the repudiation was $10 and the market price had fallen 
to $6, then they would assume that for the next fifteen or so years, those prices would 
remain constant.
67
 They recognize that “long-term contracts for the sale of commodities 
such as oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuel and the like do not have fixed quantities for remote 
time periods.”68 What to do? “We think a court should be generous in listening to an 
aggrieved party’s expert testimony about projections.”69 That does not give us much to go 
on. 
 
The decisions tend to focus on the price of the product—the difference between 
the contract and market price. There are obvious complications for determining each 
since both the price and quantity will typically not be fixed for the life of the contract. 
Even if that problem could somehow be resolved, it still puts the focus on the wrong 
                                                 
65
 White and Summers, supra note 15 at p. 334. 
66
 Id. at 334. 
67
 They qualify this by accepting any price information that would become available in the period between 
repudiation and trial. See Id. 
68
 Id. at p. 337. 
69
 Id. at p.  337. 
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question. The relevant concern should be the change in the value of the contract at the 
time of the repudiation.  
 
Ironically, there is a class of cases in which the courts have adopted the contract 
valuation approach without any fuss. When a contract is repudiated the seller can mitigate 
damages in one of two ways. It could continue to produce with damages being the 
expected difference in revenues in the pre- and post-repudiation worlds. But what if the 
expected future unit costs of production exceeded the expected prices? Then mitigation 
would entail shutting the project down. The seller’s loss would be the expected future 
revenues less the expected cost of producing that revenue—lost profit. Courts have 
recognized this measure, treating it as obvious, without any reference to 2-723. For 
example, in a casebook favorite, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County 
Coal Co.,
70
 (NIPSCO) the seller closed the coal mine and Judge Posner concluded: “The 
loss to Carbon County from the breach of contract is simply the difference between (1) 
the contract price (as escalated over the life of the contract in accordance with the 
contract’s escalator provisions) times quantity, and (2) the cost of mining the coal over 
the life of the contract. Carbon County does not even argue that $181 million is not a 
reasonable estimate of the present value of the difference.”71 
 
Courts have struggled with variable quantity contracts—take-or-pay and 
minimum quantity obligations. One issue, not of concern here, is whether these should be 
viewed as liquidated damages or penalties or something else.
72
 For assessing damages, 
the decisions do not always distinguish between two different problems—the anticipatory 
repudiation of the contract and a failure to perform a past obligation. After discussing the 
courts’ muddled treatment of take-or-pay contracts I will consider a Second Circuit 
decision in which the court was confronted with determining damages for the early 
repudiation of a twenty-year contract.
73
 Next I will consider issues raised in another of 
Judge Posner’s opinions— Lake River v. Carborundum.74 I will conclude this Section 
with a discussion of an English case involving the repudiation of a take-or-pay contract. 
 
A. Take-or-Pay 
 
For many years, natural gas prices were regulated at below market-clearing 
prices. One of the devices sellers used to charge a higher effective price was to include 
take-or-pay clauses with a high required “take”. That is, a buyer might have to promise to 
pay for 90% of the contract quantity in any given year, even if it didn’t take that much. 
After the industry was deregulated there was a substantial increase in production. When 
all energy prices fell in the 1980’s gas prices plummeted too, and buyers wanted out. 
                                                 
70
 799 F.2d 265 (1986) 
71
 At 279. 
72
 There is a long list of economically minded scholars who have criticized American law’s hostility to 
penalty clauses. For my contributions to that literature, see Framing Contract Law, ch. 17 and Rethinking 
Contract Law and Design, ch. 7. 
73
 Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 104 (2007). 
74
 769 F. 2d 1284 (7
th
 Cir. 1985). 
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Many deals were renegotiated; in others buyers repudiated.
 75
 Since natural gas is a 
“good,” the UCC applied and the courts attempted to apply the Code remedies, notably 
§2-723, to the problem. A key question for the courts was whether after the repudiation 
the buyer would be liable for the full price of the gas it had promised to take or a remedy 
based on the price differential. The decisions reflect how the courts have struggled to 
shoehorn the problem into the UCC boxes; in addition, the courts sometimes appear to 
conflate two separate issues: what would be the remedy if there were a shortfall in a 
single installment; and what would be the remedy if the buyer repudiated the entire 
contract?
76
  
 
1. Manchester Pipeline.  The Manchester Pipeline Company, a seller of natural 
gas, entered into a contract with Peoples Natural Gas Company (PNG), a natural gas 
distribution company. “The Document provided for a term of ten years and contained 
detailed provisions concerning price, minimum ‘take’ obligations, determination of 
reserves, and the right of PNG to reduce the price paid for gas taken in order to remain 
competitive in the gas market.”77 PNG repudiated in the first year. It lost its argument 
that there was not an enforceable contract and the court turned its attention to damages. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It is instructive to see how the trial court 
framed the damage question in its jury instruction: 
In order to determine the amount of damages: (1) for the first year, you 
may consider the evidence presented with regard to the difference between 
the agreed to price, if any, for the gas and the price obtained at resale of 
the gas to Scissortail Natural Gas Company, but that price is not 
conclusive, except to the extent that it reflects a standardized market price 
at the time and place defendant [PNG] would have had to take the amount 
of gas agreed, if there was an agreement, to be taken for the first year; plus 
(2) for the years two through ten, you may consider the evidence presented 
with regard to the difference, if any, between the market price for the gas 
at the time and place in the future when defendant [PNG] would have had 
to take that portion of plaintiff’s [Manchester’s] reserves as agreed, if 
agreed, and the agreed price, if any.
78
 
 
Repudiation of the take-or-pay clause would not entitle the seller to the stream of future 
payments (the “pay” component of the take-or-pay).  The post-repudiation damages 
would be based not on the price, but only on the price differential. The court of appeals 
agreed on that principle. The issue on which the trial judge was reversed was how those 
future prices should be determined. In his denial of PNG’s motion for a new trial, the trial 
judge had said: 
                                                 
75 Over 100 cases were filed. J. Michael Medina et al., Take or Litigate: Enforcing The Plain Meaning Of 
The Take-Or-Pay Clause In Natural Gas Contracts, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 185, 187 (1986). 
76
 UCC 2-612 distinguishes between non-conforming installments which substantially impair the contract 
as a whole and those that do not. Of course, a shortfall in a single installment in a take-or-pay contract is 
not an impairment; it is the exercise by the buyer of a contractually defined option. 
77
 Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas. Co., 862 F.2d 1439, 1440 (1988). 
78
 Id. at 1446. The Scissortail contract was a spot contract Manchester entered into when PNG repudiated. 
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The Court acknowledges that in most circumstances the measure of 
damages for repudiation is determined according to the price of the goods 
prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation. 
Okla.Stat. tit. 12A. § 2–723(a) (1981). Nevertheless, the unique 
circumstances of a gas purchase agreement with a take or pay obligation 
requires that the jury consider the extreme unpredictability of the future 
market. Giving the jury such discretion, provides the opportunity to find 
plaintiff is or is not entitled to recover damages for any alleged loss in the 
future. Because the nature of the gas market is uniquely nonstandard and 
the terms of gas purchase agreements are not easily analogized to 
commercial contracts in general, this Court finds the circumstances of this 
case, as presented at trial, fell within the scope of the commentary to 
Section 2–723, that states other reasonable methods of determining market 
price or measuring damages are not excluded from use where necessary.
79
 
 
PNG objected and the Court of Appeals agreed. This was not consistent with its 
understanding of §2-723. The court cited the Code Comment: 
There are no previous Oklahoma decisions. This changes the rule as 
previously stated in Williston on Sales, Section 587, which says that when 
an action for anticipatory breach comes to trial before performance date 
the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and 
the market value at the date fixed in the contract for performance. Thus, 
the jury must speculate by attempting to predict what the future market 
value will be. The Commercial Code rule is more certain and far easier to 
apply.
80
 
 
Like Summers and White, the court interpreted §2-723(1) as requiring the use of 
the price at the time of repudiation for all future periods. This could lead to quite bizarre 
results in a period of high inflation.
81
 An alternative interpretation would be to use the 
expected future price structure (the projected price on various future dates). In effect, the 
buyer’s obligation was to take a number of different commodities: gas in 1985, gas in 
1986, gas in 1987, and so forth. Each of those had an expected price at the moment of 
repudiation. §2-723 need not require that we lump them all together and apply a single 
price. Even if the court had resolved the price question correctly, it remained unclear how 
damages should have been assessed since other features of the contract were not taken 
into account. Thus, there was no discussion of the future quantities. Nor was there any 
discussion of how the competitive pricing (or “market-out”) clause should impact the 
results.
82
 Had the court focused on the change in the value of the contract, rather than just 
the price of gas, it would have at least posed the relevant question. 
                                                 
79
 Id. cited at 1447.  
80
 Id. cited at 1446. 
81
 If the inflation rate were high, say 7%, and if the nominal price of gas was treated as unchanged for the 
ten years, the court would implicitly assume that the real price of gas had fallen by half over the ten years. 
82
 A market-out clause allows the buyer to unilaterally modify the contract price. In 1982, one buyer in 
take-or-pay gas contracts, Tenneco, unilaterally modified 1400 contracts which had immediately 
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2. Prenalta.
83
 Prenalta sold natural gas to Colorado Interstate Gas (CIG), an 
interstate pipeline under take-or-pay contracts for a “term of 20 years and so long 
thereafter as gas is capable of being produced in commercial quantities from the gas 
leases and gas rights committed to the performance of this Agreement.”84 The contracts 
included a repricing arrangement anticipating deregulation. “Section 5.1(d) provides that 
in the event of deregulation of the price of gas sold under the contract, Prenalta would 
have the right to request a redetermination of the price during the first six months after 
the date of deregulation and during the six-month period preceding each five year 
anniversary of the date of deregulation. Upon such request, the parties agreed to meet and 
determine a fair value of the gas.”85 The repricing option was the seller’s, but the problem 
arose when prices collapsed and the buyer wanted out. 
CIG continued to purchase gas under the contracts so there was no claim for 
repudiation. Prenalta’s claim was for the years in which CIG had failed to take gas. It 
claimed that the contract was an installment contract with failures to pay for each 
installment, and that is how the court treated it. The issue as posed by the court was 
whether this was an “alternative contract” or a liquidated damages/penalty. The court 
relied on Corbin: 
If, upon a proper interpretation of the contract, it is found that the parties 
have agreed that either one of the two alternative performances is to be 
given by the promisor and received by the promisee as the agreed 
exchange and equivalent for the return performance rendered by the 
promisee, the contract is a true alternative contract. This is true even 
though one of the alternative performances is the payment of a liquidated 
sum of money; that fact does not make the contract one for the rendering 
of a single performance with a provision for liquidated damages in case of 
breach.
86
  
 
An alternative contract may be so drawn as to limit the power of the 
promisor to discharge his contractual duty by performing one of the 
alternatives to a definite period of time, after the expiration of which only 
the other alternative is available to him. After the expiration of the specified 
period, the obligation of the promisor becomes single and the contract is no 
longer alternative. In cases like this, the promisee must always estimate his 
damages on the basis of the second alternative . . . . Usually the alternative 
that is eliminated by the expiration of the period of time is the performance 
of service or the transfer of property, while the second alternative is the 
payment of a named sum of money.
87
 
                                                                                                                                                 
exercisable market-out clauses; it had 20 contracts without such clauses. See Forest Oil Corp. v. Tenneco, 
Inc., 622 F.Supp. 152, 153 (1985). 
83
 Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas. Co., 944 F.2d 677 (1991). 
84
 Id. at 680. 
85
 Id. at 681. 
86
 § 1082 of Corbin on Contracts 
87
 § 1085 of Corbin on Contracts. (emphasis added by court) 
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Prenalta argued that the contract “clearly provides the contract remedy for breach, 
and that the measure of damages under the provision is the value of the ‘quantity of gas 
which is equal to the difference between the Contract Quantity and Buyer’s actual takes’ 
for each year CIG has been in breach of the contracts.”88 The court agreed.  
 
We find that the language of § 4.2 . . . unambiguously expresses the intent 
of Prenalta and CIG to fashion a specific remedy for breach by requiring 
CIG to pay the value of the shortfall—the contract price multiplied by the 
difference between the contract quantity and the amount of gas actually 
taken during each one year period.
89
  
 
Characterizing CIG’s decision not to take gas as a “breach” is inapposite. The failure to 
take was not a breach of the contract; it was simply CIG’s exercise of its discretion under 
the contract. The only breach was CIG’s subsequent failure to pay for the flexibility. For 
each period in which CIG chose to take less than the “take,” it would be liable for the 
shortfall times the current price. 
 
 Corbin’s characterization of the alternative performance works fine when it is 
applied to specific shortfalls. But what happens when a court tries to apply it to the future 
years of a repudiated contract? That was the issue posed in Roye Realty v. Arkla
90
 and 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc.
91
 which came to opposite conclusions. 
 
3. Arkla. The Oklahoma Supreme Court purported to answer a certified question: 
“What is the measure of damages under a take-or-pay gas purchase contract where the 
seller alleges an anticipatory repudiation by the buyer and buyer alleges that had it 
elected to ‘take’ gas, seller could not have physically delivered gas over the entire term of 
the contract?”92  
 
Roye Realty argued that “the damages for such repudiation should be based upon 
the ‘pay’ alternative under the contract and be calculated according to Arkla's minimum 
obligation from the date of the alleged repudiation through the end of the contract 
term.”93 It took the Prenalta result and projected it forward—the deficiency payment 
obligation would provide the measure of damages for all the future years. The court 
disagreed. It invoked §2-708 and §2-723, claiming that the damages should be measured 
by the market/contract price differential at the time of repudiation. “Because the 
provisions of the UCC apply to gas purchase contracts, we hold that the measure of 
damages for anticipatory repudiation of both the take and the pay obligations in a take-or- 
                                                 
88
 944 F.2d 677 (1991) at 687. 
89
 Id. at 688.  
90
 Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla.1993). 
91
 854 P.2d 1232 (1993). 
92
 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla.1993) at 1152. Regarding the second part of the question the court noted: “If the 
seller is capable of performance on the date of the breach, the damages recoverable will not be diminished.” 
(At 1160) 
93
 Id. at 1152. 
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pay gas purchase contract is the difference between the market price at the time when the 
aggrieved party learned of the repudiation and the unpaid contract price.”94  
 
After the repudiation, the seller would be freed of its obligation to deliver gas and 
could sell to others, in effect, mitigating the loss. “[B]y selling the gas on the open market 
and utilizing the §2-708(1) measure of damages to get the difference between the market 
price and the contract price, Roye Realty will obtain the same price for its gas as if Arkla 
would have fully performed.”95 The court, as noted, used the contract/market price 
differential in the first period (§2-723) to determine the future price. What would it use 
for the future contract price and future contract quantity? Neither of these would be 
known on the date of repudiation in a typical take-or-pay contract. The court was silent 
on both, although I suspect that if pushed it would have assumed that these would have 
remained the same over the remaining life of the contract. Nor did it take into account 
any other features of the contract—for example, whether either party had an early 
termination option or whether there was a makeup clause. Nonetheless, the court was 
satisfied that it had answered the first part of the certified question: “that the measure of 
damages for repudiation is provided in the UCC.”96 
 
As it turned out, it was not necessary to answer the first question since the trial 
court eventually held that the failure to pay was not a repudiation of the entire agreement 
after all; it was only a failure to pay for an installment. The Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit concurred in an unpublished opinion.
97
  
 
4. Chemco. Unlike Arkla, the court in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, 
Inc. appeared to find that damages for the future take obligation would be measured by 
the price, not the price differential.
98
 I say “appeared to” because there is some ambiguity 
regarding the post-trial damage measurement. In 1985, after the market price of gas 
collapsed, the buyer in a take-or-pay contract, Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG), 
claimed that the contract allowed it to terminate. In a bifurcated trial, CIG lost its claim 
on liability. In the second phase, there were three questions. First, how much should CIG 
have to pay for shortfalls in the period prior to the repudiation? Second, how much 
should CIG have to pay for the post-repudiation years?  
 
There was a third issue that might have rendered the second question moot. “CIG 
requested full production from all wells committed to the contract effective May 2, 1988. 
Chemco responded with a request for ‘reasonable written assurances’ that CIG would 
‘consider the contract in force and effect’ and intended to ‘perform [CIG’s] obligations 
under it for the remainder of its term.’”99 The jury found that the demand for assurance 
was justified and that CIG’s response did not provide adequate assurance.  
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 Id. at 1154. 
95
 Id. at 1157. 
96
 Id. at 1159. 
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 Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 78 F.3d 597, 1996 WL 87055 (10th Cir.(Okla.)) 
98
 854 P.2d 1232 (1993). 
99
 Id. at 1239. Chemco was asking for assurance three years after the repudiation because “[a]fter the phase 
I finding of liability, CIG requested the resumption of full performance from all committed wells effective 
May 2, 1988.” (Id. at 1238)  
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The jury found damages of about $3 million, about 10% of which were for the 
post-1988 (trial) period. The court does not say how the post-1988 damages were 
measured. In the court’s only discussion of damages it favored the price remedy: “The 
trial court further instructed the jury that, if they found actual damages, they should 
award ‘as such actual damages all take-or-pay payments due Chemco under the terms of 
the contract.’”100 Citing Corbin, the court stated: “Once the ‘take-and-pay’ alternative 
expired . . . performance becomes the monetary payment of a sum unambiguously 
defined by the contract ‘the difference between the [contract quantity] and the Buyer’s 
actual takes.’”101 That is clearly correct for the pre-repudiation period. “Accordingly, we 
hold that under the facts of this case the remedy for breach of the alternative performance 
obligation is the payment of damages equivalent to the value of the remaining 
performance obligation.”102 So, it would seem that CIG would be liable for the pay 
alternative for the duration of the contract. 
 
But it is not clear that the court viewed CIG as having repudiated the contract. Did 
CIG’s wrongful claim of a right to terminate entail the total breach of the contract; and 
did its subsequent request for the resumption of full performance after its loss of the 
liability phase in 1988 mean that the original contract was still in force? Had CIG only 
failed to make installment payments, the entire contract would have remained in force, 
and there would have been no post-trial damages. In a subsequent case based on the same 
contract,
103
 the court held that “the parties again had performance obligations under the 
contract, which both had recognized as valid after the April 1988 trial court ruling.”104 
So, perhaps Chemco does not deal with an anticipatory repudiation at all and it is not, 
therefore, contrary to Arkla. I think it fair to say that the opinion reflects the difficulties 
courts have had fitting a take-or-pay contract into the UCC boxes, although it is probably 
more muddled than most. 
 
5. Lost Volume. A few courts have invoked §2-708(2) (the lost volume seller) to 
justify using the price rather than the price differential to measure damages. In ANR v. 
Union Oil,
105
 the court stated that if the producer subsequently sold the gas to another 
buyer, it would still have lost a sale: “[T]hat gas which Plaintiff was required to pay for if 
not taken would be unavailable to Defendants to sell upon the expiration of their contract 
with Plaintiff. . . Defendants cannot be required to relinquish this substantial benefit 
under the contract as part of its duty to mitigate damages.”106  
 
The “benefit,” according to one commentator, A. F. Brooke, was the right to sell 
the same gas twice: “This possibility of selling the gas twice was seen as a valuable right. 
                                                 
100
 Id. at 1234. 
101
 Id. at 1237. The court appears to have treated “take-and-pay” as synonymous with “take-or-pay;” as 
noted below (at note 109), a take-and-pay contract is different, although the remedy for a repudiation would 
be the same. 
102
 Id. at 1236.  
103
 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 987 P.2d 829 (1998)  (Chemco II) 
104
 Id. at 834. 
105
 No. CIV 89-533-R (W.D.Okla.1989) 
106
 Id. at 9-10.   
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The court concluded that it would be inappropriate to require the producer to have 
mitigated its damages by resale. . . . The take-or-pay producer should not be required to 
mitigate its damages by reselling since that would entail the sacrifice of the substantial 
right to ‘sell’ the same gas twice.”107 
 
Brooke concluded that the argument only applied to the past shortfalls: “[T]he 
producer is entitled to contract-market damages only when the pipeline has made an 
anticipatory repudiation of the contract before failing to take. . . . [W]hen the contract still 
admits of alternative performance, the correct measure of damages is the one least costly 
to the breacher.”108 It is not clear whether the court would have also concluded that its 
remedy applied only to past shortfalls, or if it meant to apply it to future take obligations 
as well.  
 
The Prenalta-CIG dispute
109
 also involved a group of “take-and-pay” contracts under 
which the pipeline would be required annually to take and pay for a minimum contract 
quantity of gas. The court determined that for this type of contract the appropriate remedy 
was to treat Prenalta as a lost volume seller: “The parties agree that [2-708(1)] . . . would 
not put Prenalta in as good a position as if CIG had performed because the price under 
the contracts is less than the market price at the time and place of tender. Prenalta’s 
remedy, therefore, is provided by [2-708(2)].”110 Therefore, it held, Prenalta should have 
the opportunity to offer evidence of lost profits. The court failed to appreciate the 
difference between take-or pay and take-and-pay contracts.
 111
 In a take-or-pay contract, 
if there were a shortfall in one time period, the buyer would owe the price times the 
quantity; the seller would be free to sell to other customers without offsetting any of the 
sales. The contract would remain alive, unless the buyer chose to repudiate. In contrast, in 
a take-and-pay contract, the failure to take the contract amount would be a breach of the 
contract; damages would be the contract/market differential. if the shortfall “substantially 
impaired” the value of the contract as a whole, the seller would have the option of 
declaring a breach of the whole.
112
 
 
 6. Summing Up. In long-term take-or-pay contracts, the UCC works fine for 
dealing with a shortfall in an ongoing contract. The buyer would simply pay the contract 
price multiplied by the shortfall and both parties would continue to be bound by the 
contract.
113
 Courts get there in various ways, and the reasoning is not always transparent, 
but they do seem to figure it out. However, the UCC is, as White and Summers asserted, 
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 A.F. Brooke II, Great Expectations: Assessing The Contract Damages Of The Take-Or-Pay Producer, 70 
Tex. L. Rev. 1469, 1485 (1992). The double-payment argument also was raised in Chemco: “CIG argues 
that this puts Chemco in a better position than if the contract had been performed because it results in 
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 See Section III A. 2. 
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 944 F.2d 677 (1991) at 691. 
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 For more on take-and-pay contracts, see Daniel R. Rogers, Merrick White, Key Considerations in 
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 See UCC §2-612(3). 
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 There might be some nuances like make-up clauses, but that does not alter the basic point. 
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inadequate for dealing with repudiation of long-term contracts. It provides an answer—
not necessarily a good answer—to the question of what price of the goods should be used 
(mainly §2-723). It provides no coherent answer to the question of how (or even if) future 
quantities should be determined. It ignores significant features of the contracts such as 
early termination rights and price redetermination rights. Most decisions seem to 
conclude that for the post-decision period damages should be based on the difference 
between some measure of the difference between future contract and market prices. But 
the case law seems a bit hazy on the treatment of a repudiation and whether it should be 
treated differently from a shortfall in a particular installment. 
 
 The §2-723 inquiry focuses on the wrong price. We could adapt §2-723, 
recognizing that what we are looking for is not a single price, but the set of forward 
prices—that is, today’s price for delivery on each of the future dates. That set of prices 
would be implicit in the valuation of the contract at the repudiation date. And that 
highlights the key point. The concern should not be with the change in the price of the 
gas, but with the change in the value of the asset—the contract—at the time of the 
repudiation. The contract’s value encompasses all the nuances that the §2-723 inquiry 
fails to reach. Medina et al, make this point as well. “The payment made is for the market 
value of the gas contract, not for the purchase of reserves. Therefore, after payment of the 
damages, the producer will still own the gas although the reserves will no longer be 
contracted.”114 The value depends on, among other things, the nature of the take-or-pay 
obligation, the price adjustment mechanism (including a possible market-out), and the 
termination options. Since termination of the seller’s obligation frees it to sell the gas to 
others, the remedy would be based on the expected market/contract price differential;
115
 it 
incorporates mitigation by resale. In effect, we ask: how much would the buyer be willing 
to pay to walk away?
116
  
 
I do not mean to suggest that this would be an easy task; it would almost certainly 
require some sophisticated work by economic experts. But, I should note, this is an 
exercise parties routinely engage in when negotiating a settlement. In the period in which 
these cases were litigated, the overwhelming majority of the natural gas take-or-pay 
contracts were renegotiated, with many (probably most) including a lump sum payment 
to extricate the buyer from the deal. And, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said in 
the next case, this is the sort of exercise the parties engaged in when entering into the deal 
in the first place. 
 
B. Tractebel.  
 
In November 2000, American Electric Power Company (AEP) entered into a 
Power Purchase and Sale Agreement ((PPSA) with Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. 
(TEMI).
117
 AEP would build a cogeneration plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana that would 
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 J. Michael Medina et al., supra note 73 at 201. [footnotes omitted] 
115
 This assumes that continued production would take place. If, as noted above, the seller is better off by 
not producing, the damages would be the lost profits. 
116
 Or we could ask for how much could the seller sell the contract. 
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 487 F.3d 89 (2007). 
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supply steam to Dow Chemical and electric power to TEMI. The PPSA term was for 20 
years. Because Dow needed large quantities of steam,
118
 and because the steam and 
electricity were jointly produced, the contract required that TEMI take a substantial 
amount of electricity. The contract included a “must-take” provision. It also included a 
minimum guarantee of $50 million and a mechanism by which either party could request 
that the guarantee be increased if it believed the guarantee had become inadequate.
119
 
AEP spent about $500 million building the facility; before the facility was on line, the 
market for electricity collapsed and TEMI wanted out. AEP requested that the guarantee 
be increased to reflect the new conditions and TEMI refused.  
 
 To show that AEP had reasonable grounds for believing that the guarantee was 
inadequate it had to show that the present value of gains and losses exceeded $50 million. 
This was not too hard since there was evidence that, prior to repudiation, TEMI had 
produced internal calculations showing termination payments in excess of $600 million. 
The court concluded that TEMI’s refusal was unreasonable and that TEMI had repudiated 
the agreement; it then confronted the damage assessment issue.
120
  
 
Each side provided expert testimony on AEP’s lost profits. AEP’s witness 
concluded that the present value of its losses over the twenty-year period was between 
$417 and $604 million with the most likely case being $520 million.
121
 TEMI’s expert 
claimed that AEP suffered no loss. In effect, he concluded that the repudiation was a gift 
to AEP, so TEMI should pay nothing. The trial judge was not impressed by either expert: 
“I found both experts provided unreliable testimony and worse yet, it appeared to be 
clouded by their obvious advocacy, to paraphrase a popular show tune, on behalf of the 
lady they came in with.”122 But even if they had done impeccable work, he would not 
have accepted it; it would be too speculative: 
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 “Because Dow needs large quantities of steam in its operations, the units need to run, and therefore 
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 Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., Nos. 03 Civ.6731 HB, 03 Civ.6770 
HB, 2006 WL 147586 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) at p. 3. Reconsideration Order. 
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In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next twenty 
years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and varied body of 
facts. Any projection of lost profits would necessarily include assumptions 
regarding the price of electricity and the costs of operating over twenty 
years. One would also need to surmise what competing forms of energy 
such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the same time period. 
Also factoring into this calculation are the political and regulatory 
developments over twenty years, population growth in the Entergy region, 
and technological advances affecting the production of power and related 
products. With so many unknown variables, these experts might have done 
as well had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.
123
 
  
So, he concluded, the lost profits damages were zero.
124
 
 
The trial judge treated the lost profit claim as one of consequential damages 
which, under New York law, require a higher standard of proof than general damages. In 
his reconsideration order he held that “even under the far more flexible standard for 
general damages, AEP failed to meet its burden of proof.”125 The Court of Appeals 
disagreed on both counts. The damages were general, it held, and if proof were 
disallowed because of all the confounding factors, no victims of a repudiation of a long-
term contract could ever be compensated.
126
  
 
The Court of Appeals held that AEP’s “lost profits” was the appropriate damage 
remedy. It is important to recognize that “lost profits” should not be viewed as a separate 
element of damages. It is the change in the value of the asset—the contract. That would 
be the expected future revenues had the contract been performed less the amount AEP 
would receive in the plant’s next best use (i.e., mitigation by selling at the new, lower 
expected market price). Of course, since the electricity prices had collapsed, one thing 
was clear—the value of the contract had to have increased. The TEMI expert’s 
conclusion that there were no damages could not possibly be correct.  
 
The contract did include a mechanism for assessing a market-related price to 
determine a termination payment.  
 
The market price was to be ‘based on broker, dealer or exchange 
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quotations’ for the immediately ensuing ‘five year period ... or such longer 
period for which a market is available.’ PPSA § 7.1.2. Section 7.1.2 also 
specified that, to calculate the projected Termination Payment, the market 
price of the Products sold to TEMI ‘shall be based on broker, dealer or 
exchange quotations’ for five years, escalated at 3% per year through the 
remaining term of the PPSA.
127
  
 
Because the market was illiquid, there were no observable market prices; to make up for 
that, AEP used “two-ways” to generate forward prices for the five years.  In a two-way, 
AEP would quote both an offer to buy and to sell; “AEP’s bids and offers were fully 
executable, [so] if another party decided to act on AEP’s numbers, AEP would actually 
follow through and consummate the transaction.”128 None did, but the court concluded 
that this was a plausible form of market price discovery, one that TEMI itself had used in 
the past. 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that while the projection of lost profits would be 
difficult, it is, in effect, the same exercise the parties engaged in when negotiating the 
twenty-year contract in the first place: 
 
It is no less speculative for the district court to determine AEP’s loss over 
the twenty-year period than it was for TEMI to calculate its expected 
profit from the PPSA at the time it entered into the agreement. The district 
court stated that the parties’ respective experts could “have done as well 
had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.” If it is true that projecting 
profits over twenty years is so absurdly speculative that economists can do 
no better than fortune tellers, it would have been imprudent for the parties 
to enter a contract for such a long period in the first place. The reality, 
however, is that long-term contracts are entered into regularly, and a 
degree of speculation is acceptable in the business community.
129
 
 
C. Lake River.130  
 
Carborundum promised to pay Lake River for bagging a minimum quantity of its 
product (Ferro Carbo) over a three-year period. Lake River stood ready to provide 
bagging services for up to 400 tons per week for three years. Carborundum agreed to pay 
for a minimum of 22,500 tons (a bit over one-third of the maximum)
131
 for around 
$533,000. Because of a decline in the market for Ferro Carbo, Carborundum ended up 
only requiring Lake River to bag about half the minimum. Lake River sued for payment 
for the other half. Carborundum defended by arguing that this would be an unenforceable 
penalty, and the court, Judge Posner, upheld the defense. I have argued elsewhere that 
this was wrong. The minimum quantity clause was neither a penalty nor a liquidated 
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damages clause. The contract should have been interpreted as Lake River granting 
Carborundum flexibility and that the minimum quantity was an element in the price Lake 
River received for granting that flexibility.
132
  
 
In its brief, Carborundum presented a hypothetical. What if during the entire three 
years Carborundum had delivered not even one pound? It would be absurd, it argued, to 
bill Carborundum for the entire 22,500 tons. But, given that Lake River would have had 
to maintain its ability to bag 400 tons per week for the entire period, it would not be at all 
absurd. That was the price it paid for flexibility. Lake River would have fully performed 
by holding itself ready for the entire three years. The only breach, as in Prenalta, would 
have been Carborundum’s failure to pay. 
 
In the course of his opinion, Judge Posner posed a similar hypothetical, but there 
was a big difference. “Suppose to begin with that the breach occurs the day after Lake 
River buys its new bagging system for $89,000 and before Carborundum ships any Ferro 
Carbo.”133 He, like Carborundum, suggested that compensating Lake River would have 
resulted in a huge windfall and, therefore, it would be a penalty. There is, however, a 
fundamental difference between the actual case in which the three-year term had expired 
and Posner’s hypothetical one in which one party repudiated prior to expiration. Would 
Carborundum still have to pay for the 22,500 tons or would Lake River have been 
required to mitigate its damages? Judge Posner claimed that Lake River raised this 
argument: “Lake River argues that it would never get as much as the formula suggests, 
because it would be required to mitigate its damages.”134 He rejected the argument 
because, he claimed, it would undercut the virtues of liquidated damages.   
 
Properly understood, Lake River’s compensation, in this hypothetical, would not 
be $533,000. The question that should have been asked regarding the repudiation was, 
again, what was the change in value of the asset—the contract? In effect, mitigation 
would be baked into the damage measurement. That is, upon repudiation Lake River no 
longer would have to remain ready to bag any goods. In that sense it could mitigate by 
using its resources for other purposes. To take an example even more extreme than Judge 
Posner’s, suppose that the day after signing the agreement and before any investments 
had been made, Carborundum repudiated. And suppose further that there had been no 
change in the market. This is really no different from the simple breach of a widget 
contract in which the price had not changed. The price of the contract would remain 
unchanged and damages would be zero.  
 
D. M&J Polymers.  
 
In M&J Polymers Ltd v Imerys Minerals Ltd,
135
 an English court was confronted 
for the first time with the question of whether a take-or-pay clause was unenforceable 
because it was a penalty. The contract, for the supply of chemical dispersants, was for 
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three years with monthly minimum quantities.
136
 The contract was repudiated but the 
buyer had not paid for the minimum quantities prior to the repudiation. The court framed 
the issue: 
 
 This issue relates to the claimant’s claim in respect of the shortfall of 
deliveries . . . until the (repudiatory) termination of the supply contract in 
May 2006. The claimant claims the price of such shortfall, pursuant to the 
take or pay clause, article 5.5. The defendant asserts that the claim 
pursuant to the take or pay clause amounts to a penalty, and that the 
claimant must be limited to a claim for breach of the defendant’s 
obligation under article 5.3 to order the specified minimum quantities. It is 
common ground that, once the contract was terminated, [i.e.] after May 
2006 and in respect of the balance of the supply contract, the claimant’s 
claim is in damages only, as it did not seek to keep the contract alive.
137
 
 
That is, the court (and the parties) took for granted that the repudiation did not entitle the 
seller to the contract price on the remaining quantities. On the issue that it did face, it had 
no difficulty rejecting the notion that the take-or-pay constituted a penalty. In both 
respects the decision is consistent with my interpretation of both the actual and 
hypothetical versions of Lake River. That is, it would award full payment of the price for 
past shortfalls and the contract/market differential for the post-breach sales. 
 
E. Summing Up.  
 
The “take-or-pay” and “minimum quantity” contracts are basically the same. The 
former sets a series of minimum obligations and the latter sets a single obligation. In a 
take-or-pay contract, each period can be treated as an installment; so long as the court 
does not find the contract terminated (an anticipatory repudiation), the contract remains 
in force. If after the year (or some other relevant time period) has passed and the buyer 
had failed to take the required amount, the buyer would have to pay the price multiplied 
by the shortfall, as the court found in Prenalta.
138
 Likewise, if the parties agreed on a 
minimum quantity over a fixed period, if the buyer failed to reach the minimum, it should 
be liable for the same thing—the price multiplied by the shortfall. That was the result 
rejected by Judge Posner in Lake River. The take-or-pay contract has multiple periods 
while the minimum quantity contract has but one. Analytically, there is no difference. 
 
If a buyer were to repudiate a take-or-pay contract, the damages would not be the 
price multiplied by the shortfall. The damages should be the change in value of the 
contract at the moment of repudiation—the present value of the difference in the 
expected cash flows. That would be based on the projected market/contract price 
differential or the lost profits, depending on whether the seller could do something else 
with the goods in the remaining years. We could call it mitigation, but it is more 
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straightforward to simply recognize it as an element in finding the change in the value of 
the contract. In effect, that is what the court did in Tractebel and, as we shall see in the 
next Section, it is what international arbitration tribunals do when assessing damages. 
That seems to be the direction the court was taking in both Manchester Pipeline and 
Arkla, although both decisions were a bit confused. Repudiation of a minimum quantity 
contract, as in Posner’s hypothetical, should be no different. The major distinction is that 
it would be a lot easier to assess damages since there would be less difficulty in 
determining both the quantity and the contract/market differential. 
 
F. Why Damages at Time of Breach? 
 
When I presented an earlier version of this paper in Germany, the participants 
proposed two alternatives to reckoning the damages for the repudiation of a long-term 
contract at the time of the breach. Why not award specific performance? Or, alternatively, 
why not wait until the full performance was due, perhaps requiring the non-breacher to 
sue multiple times? In NIPSCO, discussed above, the buyer asked for specific 
performance, but Judge Posner rejected it:
139
 
 
Indeed, specific performance would be improper as well as unnecessary 
here, because it would force the continuation of production that has 
become uneconomical. Cf. Farnsworth, supra, at 817–18. No one wants 
coal from Carbon County’s mine. With the collapse of oil prices, which 
has depressed the price of substitute fuels as well, this coal costs far more 
to get out of the ground than it is worth in the market. Continuing to 
produce it, under compulsion of an order for specific performance, would 
impose costs on society greater than the benefits. NIPSCO’s breach, 
though it gave Carbon County a right to damages, was an efficient breach 
in the sense that it brought to a halt a production process that was no 
longer cost-justified. 
 
 It would indeed have been inefficient for Carbon County to continue producing coal that 
NIPSCO couldn’t use. But, Judge Posner noted, specific performance does not require 
actual performance.
140
 It simply would give the buyer a bargaining chip and the seller 
                                                 
139
 At 279. 
140
 “With continued production uneconomical, it is unlikely that an order of specific performance, if made, 
would ever actually be implemented. If, as a finding that the breach was efficient implies, the cost of a 
substitute supply (whether of coal, or of electricity) to NIPSCO is less than the cost of producing coal from 
Carbon County’s mine, NIPSCO and Carbon County can both be made better off by negotiating a 
cancellation of the contract and with it a dissolution of the order of specific performance. Suppose, by way 
of example, that Carbon County’s coal costs $20 a ton to produce, that the contract price is $40, and that 
NIPSCO can buy coal elsewhere for $10. Then Carbon County would be making a profit of only $20 on 
each ton it sold to NIPSCO ($40–$20), while NIPSCO would be losing $30 on each ton it bought from 
Carbon County ($40–$10). Hence by offering Carbon County more than contract damages (i.e., more than 
Carbon County’s lost profits), NIPSCO could induce Carbon County to discharge the contract and release 
NIPSCO to buy cheaper coal. For example, at $25, both parties would be better off than under specific 
performance, where Carbon County gains only $20 but NIPSCO loses $30. Probably, therefore, Carbon 
County is seeking specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can 
think of no reason why the law should give it such leverage.” (279-280) 
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would have to pay to lift the injunction. If there were no holdup issues, the parties’ 
negotiations would determine the value of the contract better than an ex post battle of the 
experts. If, however, holdup were a significant problem, as would have been the case in 
NIPSCO, the specific performance remedy becomes less attractive. In cases in which the 
holdup potential is low, the specific performance remedy might be superior to the damage 
remedy. The holdup potential would be lower in the situation in which the claimant could 
only sue seriatim for past failures; we should expect that, since the holdup threat is 
weaker, the parties might be able to negotiate a settlement that would reflect their 
expectations about the future. The settlement value would depend upon more than the 
expected future damages; it would also reflect the expected costs of repeated suits and the 
vulnerability of each of the parties to the timing of the damage payments. It is at least 
plausible that parties might prefer a regime in which multiple suits would be required to 
one in which the damages are measured once and for all. The fact that the suits would be 
required does not, of course, mean that there would in fact be multiple suits; it would 
simply provide the basis for settlement of the future claims. To be clear, I am not 
proposing that requiring multiple suits (rejecting anticipatory repudiation in long-term 
contracts) would be superior; I am only raising the possibility that this might be 
workable. 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 
Complex long-term contracts, like the natural gas, Tractebel, and NIPSCO 
contracts of the previous section, typically involve a substantial up-front investment by 
one party. After that investment has been made, the investor faces a problem. The 
counterparty might engage in holdup, taking advantage of the investor’s vulnerability to 
revise the terms of the deal.
141
 The contract should be structured to take this risk into 
account, although as we have seen, the structuring does not resolve all the problems. If 
the investment project is with a foreign country the risks are exacerbated. The investor 
faces the possibility that the State might choose not to honor the contract, or to reduce the 
contract’s value by changes in regulations or by imposing taxes.  Not all such actions by 
the government would be compensable. That issue nowadays is typically determined in 
international arbitration, often under a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).  
 
So, suppose that Oilco had entered into a participation agreement with the Duchy 
of Grand Fenwick in which it would explore for oil and, if successful, spend billions to 
exploit the field. Oilco and Fenwick would then share the revenue according to a preset 
formula. The project turned out to be successful and after a few years of operation the 
price of oil increased far beyond what the parties had anticipated when they entered into 
the arrangement. Moreover, the government of Fenwick had changed to one less friendly 
to large multi-national corporations. Although the agreement had language that said that 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
141
 See Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell Journal of Economics, 426, 439 
(1976) and Herfried Wöss, et al, Damages in International Arbitration Under Complex Long-Term 
Contracts, Oxford University Press, §§6.04-6.06 (2014). 
 33 
tax rates could only be changed if both parties agree,
142
 suppose that Fenwick unilaterally 
raised the rates.
143
 Or, perhaps, it simply declared the agreement at an end. In either 
event, Oilco could bring an action under the BIT, either for breach of contract or 
violation of the treaty or both. Many BITs include an “umbrella” clause which is 
designed to permit an investor to proceed against the State for a breach of contract;
144
 and 
sometimes the investors are successful.
145
 In effect, Oilco would argue that the State’s 
breach of the contract amounted to destroying, or significantly impairing, the value of the 
asset. Whether the claim is for breach of contract, breach of a treaty obligation, or 
expropriation, if the panel were to find in favor of Oilco, Fenwick would be liable for 
damages.
146
 What principles should guide the arbitration panel?
147
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The loss of a claimant like Oilco would be the value of the contract (or property) 
that was taken—the change in the present value of the expected future cash flows. The 
decision by the Permanent Court of Justice (PCJI) in the Factory at Chorzow
148
 is widely 
cited in arbitration awards as determining the appropriate standard for compensation.
149
 
The panel stated: “The essential principle . . . which seems to be established by 
international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that 
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.”150 Timothy Nelson noted that the Chorzow panel did not have a chance 
to implement its vision since the parties settled.
151
 Chorzow really was nothing more than 
flowery rhetoric which has somehow been elevated to a principle—a principle which 
commentators and arbitration panels have felt free to mold to their own purposes.  
Much of the controversy over Chorzow’s application has been over determining 
the date at which damages should be measured. Should it be reckoned at the date of 
breach, the date of decision, or some time in between? Wöss, et al characterize the 
Chorzow principle as “equivalent to compensation for specific performance.”152 Since the 
panel could not provide for actual performance, this would entail awarding the financial 
equivalent, monetary specific performance.
153
 That is, assuming the claimant’s contract 
or property had not been impaired by the State, what would it have been worth had the 
claimant held it until the time of the decision? Unlike some other commentators, the 
authors are aware that this does not mean that damages must be measured at the time of 
the decision (although that is what they ultimately opt for).
154
 Compensation should be 
determined by the “but for” test: how much would the asset (property, contract) have 
been worth had there not been a breach, compared to what it is worth after the breach. 
As was argued above,
155
 when the adverse event occurs, the claimant should be 
indifferent between damages measured at the time of the breach and damages measured 
at the time of award (or any other randomly chosen point in time).
156
 If in the intervening 
years between breach (expropriation) and decision, oil prices rose more than had been 
anticipated, Oilco would prefer time-of-award; and if they had fallen Oilco would prefer 
time of the breach. But at the moment of breach it would not have known which would 
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happen. So, under the “veil of ignorance” the claimant should be indifferent. There is a 
crucial proviso to which I shall return, namely, that the time-of-breach remedy must be 
bolstered by the appropriate prejudgment interest rate. 
Measuring damages at the moment of breach can be viewed as answering the 
hypothetical question: for how much could you sell the contract right to a willing buyer? 
Some arbitration panels confuse this by treating the decision of when or whether to sell 
post-breach as a fact question. So, for example, in Unglaube v. Costa Rica,
157
 the panel 
“held that, but for the government interference, the property owner could have sold at the 
peak of the real estate market in 2006, when buyers were ‘plentiful’ and therefore based 
damages on the hypothesis such a sale would have occurred, albeit six-months before the 
true peak of the market.”158 And in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia,159  
[T]he Tribunal observed that, “[i]n certain circumstances full reparation 
for an unlawful expropriation will require damages to be awarded as of the 
date of the arbitral Award.” On this analysis, “[i]t may be appropriate to 
compensate for value gained between the date of the expropriation and the 
date of the award in cases where it is demonstrated that the Claimants 
would, but for the taking, have retained their investment.” But in that case, 
the ‘date of award’ approach was not adopted because the evidence did not 
indicate that the claimants would have continued to operate their 
investment, post-1995.
160  
Because the parties should be indifferent, the Chorzow Factory principle tells us 
nothing about the point at which damages should be reckoned and the role of post-breach 
information. Arbitration panels have varied in their response. Some, for example, ADC 
Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary,
161
 Amco Asia Corp v. Indonesia,
162
 Siemens AG v. Argentina,
163
 
and ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Venezuela,
164
 have used the time of the award. 
However, the more common approach has been to use the time of the breach.
165
 
 
Wöss, et al and Abdala & Spiller
166
 argue that Chorzow Factory does not pose an 
either/or question. Recognizing that damages measured at the time of award, could be 
negative, they add a new wrinkle: the claimant should receive the greater of the measured 
damages at the time of the award and the time of the breach:  
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The reference to ‘wipe out all consequences of the illegal act’ establishes 
the full compensation principle for damages in international law. Full 
compensation under the Chorzow case means awarding the higher of the 
value of the company at the moment of breach or at the moment of the 
award. If the moment of valuation is the date of award, lost profits from 
the date of the breach to the date of the award have to be added.
167
  
Their rationale appears to be that the expropriation deprived Oilco the option of selling its 
business at the time of the expropriation so the value at that date should set a floor.
168
 
Their interpretation does not follow either from the Chorzow Factory language or from 
the economic sense of the transaction. The market price at the time of the treaty breach 
already included the right to sell the business. The authors suggest that their interpretation 
would give the State better incentives when contemplating an expropriation. In effect, 
they tack on a penalty to discourage the State from excessive taking.  “[U]nder the 
asymmetric Chorzow Factory’s standard, a state will never benefit, economically, from 
expropriation, and may actually end up acquiring an asset for more than it is worth at the 
time of expropriation. The asymmetry in Chorzow Factory provides substantial 
incentives for states to be cautious in undertaking expropriatory actions.”169  Even if one 
were to believe that penalizing the State is a good idea, the notion that the penalty should 
take this particular form is a non sequitur.  
The decision might come years after the breach and years before the contract was 
to end. Measured damages will depend on how interest is taken into account.
170
 There are 
two questions relating to interest: the discount rate for future gains and losses and, if the 
damages are measured at the time of the breach, the prejudgment interest rate (PJI). 
Claimants desire a low discount rate and a high PJI, and respondents the reverse. Not 
surprisingly, expert witnesses differ, although the extent of the disagreement might be 
surprising (and disappointing). To illustrate the extent of their disagreement, in one 
arbitration the claimant proposed a discount rate and PJI of 10.63%; the respondent’s 
experts proposed a discount rate of 19.85% and a PJI of 2.9%. The panel chose neither, 
setting the discount rate at 14.33% and the PJI at 5.633331%.
171
  
 
A useful way of framing the question is to pose it (hypothetically) to the claimant 
at the moment of breach: at what point would you want the damages be reckoned? As I 
noted above, the parties should be indifferent, ex ante, between two measures: damages at 
the time of the breach plus prejudgment interest (PJI) and damages at the time of decision 
(including actual losses in the post-breach, pre-decision period). The equivalence depends 
on choosing the proper prejudgment interest rate. Experts generally agree that the 
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discount rate should be the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As the previous 
paragraph shows there is room for substantial disagreement, but at least there is general 
agreement on the principle.  That is not the case with PJI.
172
 Some economists argue that 
the WACC should also be used for the PJI.
173
 Others argue for a risk-free rate.
174
 I find 
the risk-free rate argument more compelling, but I need not resolve the matter here. As 
Wöss, et al indicate, arbitration panels have used a variety of PJI’s, some ad hoc.175 For 
my purposes it is enough to recognize that if we choose the “wrong” PJI the equivalence 
no longer holds. 
 
 The possible non-equivalence might incline one to opt for the time-of-decision 
measure of damages, incorporating all the post-breach information. However, there is a 
countervailing factor. Some of the changes that occurred post-breach could have been 
caused by the breach. Suppose, for example, that after Fenwick took control of the oil 
field Oilco threatened to sue anyone who purchased the oil; as a result sales declined and 
the price for the oil that was sold was reduced.
176
 Or suppose that the expropriation had 
resolved an assembly problem, increasing the value.
177
 The decision-date measure of 
damages would have to be modified to account for all value changes that were caused by 
the breach. 
 
  The expected value of the date-of-breach and the date-of-award measures is 
roughly the same, subject to the qualifications in the previous paragraphs. My preference 
for a default rule is the date-of-breach which would make it consistent with contract 
damage measures generally. The important point is that whatever rule is chosen, that it be 
chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Parties could choose to opt out of the default rule in 
their initial agreement or, perhaps, in the BIT.
178
 If the period between breach and filing 
were short, the claimant could be given the choice between the date-of-filing and the 
date-of-decision. That might be a feasible compromise. The key point is that at the time 
of breach, there is no reason to believe that the choice of a measurement date would 
systematically favor one party. 
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The Oilco hypothetical presupposed that the project was already producing 
revenue. What if the State were to renege at an earlier stage? That was the problem the 
panel faced in Metalclad.
179
 Metalclad had a federal permit to build a hazardous waste 
landfill. The local government, Guadalcazar, effectively prevented it from opening the 
landfill. Metalclad claimed that Mexico had violated the NAFTA agreement and the 
arbitration panel agreed, holding that the measures were “tantamount to expropriation.”180 
Metalclad asked for damages based on the discounted cash flow of future profits, or, 
alternatively, its actual investment. The panel rejected the lost profits measure because 
there had been no track record of earnings, adopting instead Metalclad’s actual 
investment.
181
 In effect, it applied a modified new business rule: if the business has not 
operated, presume that it would not make more than the opportunity cost of capital 
(hence zero expected future earnings); but if the firm had already made specific 
investments it could recover some, or all, of its investment (reliance costs).
182
  
I have presumed that the breach took place at a single point in time. However, 
there might be a series of actions that adversely affect Oilco—a problem that has been 
labeled “creeping expropriation.”183 Suppose, for example, that Fenwick imposed a tax 
on Oilco in year 1 and a second tax in year 2, and more taxes in subsequent years, and 
suppose further that an arbitration panel concluded that these taxes violated the BIT. I 
don’t think this should make damage assessment any more difficult. Each tax may be 
viewed as a partial breach with damages assessed for the period in which it was in 
force.
184
 If the taxes eventually resulted in the total destruction of value, then the final 
component of the award should be for what was left after the penultimate tax hike. It 
should be the present value of the stream of future losses valued at the time of the final 
breach and it should be added to the actual losses incurred in the previous partial 
breaches. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
What does it mean to make the victim of a contract breach whole? I have argued 
that the contract should be viewed as an asset and the claimant’s loss would be the 
decline in value of that asset.
185
 Damages could be measured at the time of the breach, 
using only information available at that time. Or damages could be reckoned at some 
                                                 
179
 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1. 
180
Id. at  ¶104. “[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged 
takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host 
State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving 
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.” Id. at  ¶103 
181
 Id. at  ¶¶114-122.  
182
 For more on the “new business rule” and why there should be no recovery of lost profits in a case like 
Metalclad, see Goldberg, “The New Business Rule and Compensation for Lost Profits,” 1 Criterion 
Journal of Innovation 341 (2016). 
183
 W. M. Reisman and R.D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 
Br.Y.B. Int’l L. 115 (2003). See also Marboe, supra note 147, §§3.51-3.56. 
184
 This would be roughly the same as treating each partial breach as a breach of an installment, as in 
Prenalta (see III. A. 2, above) and M&J Polymers (III. D) 
185
 If consequential damages were recoverable, then that could be an additional loss. 
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future date, in particular the decision date, utilizing post-breach data. Given that the value 
of the asset (the contract) can fluctuate, it should not matter which we choose, so long as 
that choice were made before the dispute arises. I think the breach date is more 
straightforward, but the more important point is that the issue should be off the table once 
a dispute arises. Essentially, the choice of the date of valuation should be under a “veil of 
ignorance.” 
 
The contract as asset approach proved useful even in the case of a breach of a 
simple commodity contract. But the big payoff was for the anticipatory repudiations of 
long-term contracts with termination dates after the decision date. For a commodity 
contract breached on the date of performance, the remedy would simply be the 
market/contract differential on that date. The only issue in this type of case is how to treat 
“cover.” My claim was that cover should not be viewed as an alternative remedy (and 
certainly not as a preferred alternative remedy), but as evidence of the market price. An 
alleged cover transaction that occurs immediately after the breach calling for the same 
quantity of an identical commodity at the same location would obviously be acceptable. 
The further it deviated from this ideal, the weaker the presumption that it reflects the 
aggrieved party’s loss. 
 
Long-term contracts present two different issues: a shortfall in an individual 
installment and an anticipatory repudiation of the entire agreement. For the former, 
whether the contract is a take-or-pay agreement or a minimum quantity agreement for 
which the seller brought suit after the term expired, the remedy would simply be the price 
multiplied by the shortfall. The only breach would be a failure to pay—the value of the 
contract itself would not be impaired.
186
 For the latter, the problem is to ascertain the 
change in the value of the asset—the contract. The present discounted value of the 
change in value will reflect expectations regarding the market price, the contract price, 
quantity, cost of production, and, perhaps, future events that might result in early 
termination of the contract. Both lost profits and mitigation are captured by the valuation 
of the contract. By focusing on the change in the value of the contract-asset, the approach 
delineates which “lost profits” matter. So, for example, if, as in the Lake River 
hypothetical,
187
 a buyer repudiated a contract before there had been any reliance and 
before the market had changed, a court might erroneously find lost profits as the 
projected quantity times the seller’s markup. I would argue that the proper damage 
measure in such a case would be zero, or nominal at best. 
 
The basic methodology for valuation is now standard, but as the divergent 
valuation estimates in Tractebel illustrate, there is a lot of room for experts to disagree.
188
 
To get some indication of the potential for disagreement, we can return to Widgetco. 
However, instead of considering a failure to deliver shares of stock, suppose that 
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Widgetco had been acquired, but that some minority shareholders have asked for an 
appraisal. The shareholders and the corporation then present expert testimony on the 
value of stock. The techniques used for this exercise are essentially the same as would be 
employed to ascertain the contract damages.  
 
About two decades ago, Wertheimer collected data on expert valuations in 
Delaware appraisal cases and his data show substantial divergences, some by a factor of 
ten or more.
189
 In a more recent study, Choi and Talley found that the gap had declined, 
but was still substantial.
190
 As then Vice Chancellor Allen asserted, “if the court will 
ultimately reject both parties DCF [discounted cash flow] analyses and do its own, the 
incentive of the contending parties is to arrive at estimates of value that are at the outer 
margins of plausibility—that essentially define a bargaining range.”191 If the damage 
estimates of experts in long-term contract and expropriation cases are destined to be at 
the outer margins of plausibility (and perhaps beyond),
192
 are there some techniques 
available to courts or arbitration panels to narrow their disagreement?  
 
I will note three. First, neutral experts could be appointed; their role could be 
defined in various ways. They could critique the reports of the party-appointed experts or, 
perhaps, perform their own damage studies. Second, some courts notably in Australia, 
and some arbitration panels have used  “hot-tubbing.” There are a number of variations 
on this practice. For example, the experts could question each other or arbitrators could 
question the witnesses directly.
193
 The presumption is that the process would constrain 
the experts and narrow the range of their disagreement. 
 
Third, the court or panel could adopt a form of “final-offer arbitration.”194 The 
court’s choice would be limited; it could not mix and match pieces of the different 
reports, split the baby, or impose any estimate proffered by neither party. It could choose 
only one party’s measure. When Vice Chancellor Allen attempted to implement it in an 
appraisal proceeding, he told both parties that it was his “inclination and [his] 
temperamental approach ... to want to accept one expert or the other hook, line and 
sinker.”195 The logic is simple enough. If a party were to get too aggressive, the decision 
maker would choose the other side’s estimate. Recognizing that, both parties have an 
incentive to take a less aggressive position. Their estimates should converge, thereby 
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narrowing the range of disagreement, or, in Allen’s words, return us from the “outer 
margins of plausibility.” 196 
 
There is no question that estimating the damages in long-term, complex 
agreements will be difficult and that courts, arbitration panels, and (gasp) lay juries will 
be confronted with reports and testimony that will make their eyes glaze over and their 
heads hurt. Still, it has to be done, unless we just want to label all such damages as 
“speculative,” and deny all recovery. Perhaps in the future, parties (or arbitration treaties) 
will include some guidelines (methods for determining prejudgment interest rates, 
discount rates, projected prices, etc.) to constrain the experts in their damage estimates. 
My concern in this paper has not been with the nuts and bolts of damage estimation, but 
instead with the conceptual framework. 
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